Exposing vital forensic artifacts of USB devices in the Windows 10 registry by Shaver, Jason S.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-06
Exposing vital forensic artifacts of USB devices in
the Windows 10 registry
Shaver, Jason S.







Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
EXPOSING VITAL FORENSIC ARTIFACTS OF USB 
DEVICES IN THE WINDOWS 10 REGISTRY 
by 
Jason S. Shaver 
June 2015 
Thesis Advisor: Neil Rowe 
Second Reader: Michael McCarrin 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2015
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
EXPOSING VITAL FORENSIC ARTIFACTS OF USB DEVICES IN THE 
WINDOWS 10 REGISTRY 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Jason S. Shaver 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Digital media devices are regularly seized pursuant to criminal investigations and Microsoft Windows is the most 
commonly encountered platform on seized computers. Microsoft recently released a technical preview build of their 
Windows 10 operating system which can run on computers, smart phones, tablets, and embedded devices. This work 
investigated the forensically valuable areas of the Windows 10 registry. The focus was on the Windows Registry 
hives affected when USB storage devices are connected to a laptop configured with Windows 10. Paths were 
identified that indicate the date/time of last insertion and removal of a thumb drive. Live monitoring and post-mortem 
forensic methodologies were used to map Registry paths containing USB identifiers such as make/model information, 
serial numbers and GUIDs. These identifiers were located in multiple paths in the allocated and unallocated space of 










14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Windows Registry, computer forensic 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
63 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
EXPOSING VITAL FORENSIC ARTIFACTS OF USB DEVICES IN THE WINDOWS 
10 REGISTRY 
Jason S. Shaver 
Computer Forensic Agent, Homeland Security Investigations 
B.A., Towson University, 2001 
M.S., University of Phoenix, 2005 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN CYBER SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2015 
Author: Jason S. Shaver 





Chair, Cyber Academic Group 
 iv




Digital media devices are regularly seized pursuant to criminal investigations and Microsoft 
Windows is the most commonly encountered platform on seized computers. Microsoft recently 
released a technical preview build of their Windows 10 operating system that can run on 
computers, smart phones, tablets, and embedded devices. This work investigated the forensically 
valuable areas of the Windows 10 registry. The focus was on the Windows Registry hives 
affected when USB storage devices are connected to a laptop configured with Windows 10. 
Paths were identified that indicate the date/time of last insertion and removal of a thumb drive. 
Live monitoring and post-mortem forensic methodologies were used to map Registry paths 
containing USB identifiers such as make/model information, serial numbers and GUIDs. These 
identifiers were located in multiple paths in the allocated and unallocated space of the Registries 
analyzed. 
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The types of crimes most commonly investigated by Computer Forensic 
Examiners (CFE) include child exploitation, identity theft, homicide, and network 
intrusion. Statistics from the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) operated by the 
National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) indicate computer crime rates have 
continually risen dramatically in the 21st century (Internet Computer Crime Complaint 
Center [IC3], 2008). The focus of many investigations includes the need to identify 
digital footprints available on seized computers that assist in re-creating a crime scene 
and telling the story of the events that occurred. Part of this discipline includes adopting 
practices that allow the CFE to identify digital storage devices that were connected to a 
computer at the focus of an investigation via universal serial bus (USB). 
The identification of USB-related footprints related to mounted devices is an 
invaluable part in the investigation of many categories of computer crime. In child 
exploitation investigations, it is imperative to determine whether relevant files were 
transferred to or from any connected devices. The successful identification of this action 
can result in the addition of a distribution charge and a longer prison sentence. Windows 
Registry artifacts can also serve to create a list of devices that were mounted to the OS 
and may assist in identifying evidence items that were not recovered in the course of the 
enforcement action.   
In network-intrusion investigations, timeline analysis may show that a 
compromise occurred on a certain date. Further investigation of software registry data 
can identify a USB device that was connected to a system and provide a clue to the origin 
of malware that was introduced thereafter. 
The presence of encryption on the USB device can pose a challenge for computer 
forensic examinations. However, software registry artifacts may still be used to link USB 
devices containing contraband files back to a computer used to commit a crime. In cases 
where the encryption is applied only to specific volumes, directories or files, the registry 
may be extracted and analyzed for vital data. There are also metadata artifacts that will be 
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discussed in the course of this research paper that may indicate files of interest are 
present on the USB device.   
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Windows is the most commonly used operating system (OS) the world over. The 
Windows Registry is an integral component that contains configuration information and 
artifacts detailing data useful in an investigation concerning the system hardware, 
software and associated components (Luttgens & Pepe, 2014). Nuances within the 
Windows Registry have appeared within each version of the Windows OS released. In 
2014, Microsoft released a technical build preview of the Windows 10 OS. The Windows 
10 OS will be released on July 29, 2015 and will become the default OS installed on 
many popular computer brands. Significant numbers of individual users will also elect to 
upgrade their OS version to Windows 10. Therefore, it will be necessary to understand 
how data will be stored within this new version of Windows. 
USB devices are often critical in investigations. It is vital for CFEs to understand 
where specific Windows Registry artifacts related to USB devices are located and the 
significance associated with the embedded metadata. Windows Registry evidence can 
show that a specific device was connected to a computer, when it was last connected and 
can provide a better awareness of the scope of a crime. There are no papers to date 
detailing these specific forensic artifacts in the Windows 10 Registry.      
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Previous descriptions of forensic artifacts for earlier versions of the Windows OS 
have been published by various researchers and organizations. The artifacts were 
gathered using a variety of forensic tools. Some tools used to gather Windows Registry 
information were open source and some were commercial, depending on the preference 
of the researcher. Four forensic tools were investigated for this thesis; each tool had 
limitations, so it was useful to compare the results obtained from their use: 
 Active monitoring of Windows Registry modifications using the Microsoft 
SysInternals ProcMon tool. 
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 Hash analysis using the EnCase tool Windows Registry values that were 
modified. 
 Comparative Windows Registry analysis using RegShot. 
 Analysis with the Perl scripts in the RegRipper tool. 
Data documenting the common results of the Windows Registry value changes 
was generated in this research. These results should help CFE’s in their future 
investigations of USB artifacts. 
The structure for the results discussed in this thesis is as follows: 
 Chapter II reviewed why Windows Registry analysis is valuable to 
forensic examiners and the data that may indicate a USB device was 
connected to a computer. 
 Chapter III covered previous research of Windows Registries with 
forensic software suites used in the identification artifacts. 
 Chapter IV focused on the methodology employed in the documentation 
of results for this thesis. Four tools were used to obtain results and validate 
the artifacts that were observed. 
 Chapter V discussed the mapped locations of Registry artifacts pertaining 
to USB devices in the Windows 10 Registry. 
 Chapter VI discussed the significance of these results and recommended 
areas where further research is recommended.   
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II. WINDOWS REGISTRY ARTIFACTS 
A. COMMONLY USED OPERATING SYSTEMS 
The operating systems (OSs) installed on home and business computers easily fall 
into two categories: Mac OS and Microsoft Windows. Versions of these OS’s have been 
in use for decades. Figure 1 was obtained from netmarketshare.com and shows that 
Windows is the leading OS of choice for over 90% of worldwide users (Netmarketshare, 
2015).         
 
Figure 1.  2015 statistics of desktop computer users 
(after Netmarketshare, 2015) 
The data collected by netmarketshare.com is drawn from a network of over 
40,000 websites that span the globe. The values counted by this service are from unique 
visitors to their network sites.   
As a result of this preference, the majority of computers seized pursuant to search 
warrants by law enforcement entities investigating computer crime will be configured 
with the Windows OS. It is essential to have a thorough understanding of relevant log and 
configuration artifacts when examining computers configured with this OS. According to 
the Figure 1, less than 15% of users have Windows 8 installed, however this is still a 
higher percentage than users with the Mac OS. Windows 10 users will also make a large 
part of the population when it is released on July 29, 2015.     
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B. WHAT IS THE WINDOWS REGISTRY? 
At the core of the Windows OS is a collection of forensically useful artifacts that 
store information vital to the stability and function of the OS: the Windows Registry. The 
Registry is defined as a central repository or database of the configuration data for the 
operating system and most of its programs (Bunting, 2012a). The Windows OS uses the 
Registry to determine permissions assigned to each user, the hardware configured within 
the computing device and a mapping of the ports that are utilized. The logs and 
configuration files in the Registry can be significant in a computer forensic investigation 
to identify activity that took place on a device. The Registry is stored in a proprietary 
format and only customized tools are useful to access the information stored within. 
The Windows Registry is organized in a “hive” structure containing keys, 
subkeys, values, and supporting files containing backups of significant data. For forensic 
analysis, the keys and subkeys can be thought of as directories. The values hold data  that 
includes a user’s Desktop preferences, time zone information, last shut down date/time, 
and information pertaining to USB-connected devices. Windows users with 
“Administrator” accounts can view the Windows Registry hives using the Regedit.exe or 
Regedt32.exe editing tools installed natively within the OS. Administrators also can 
modify and backup Windows Registry contents using this tool. An example of the 
appearance of the Windows Registry while using Regedit is shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  Regedit display of Windows Registry hive 
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C. LINK FILES 
Link files are important to track within the Windows OS. Link files bear the file 
extension .lnk and contain metadata pointers that may be significant in a forensic 
analysis. Link files are created for a variety of reasons within the Windows OS. They are 
sometimes specifically created by a user to facilitate access to a file. 
Not only can the linked file be within a different directory than the target it points 
to, it can be stored within a different physical disk and logical volume. 
The forensic value of a link is that a link file bearing a pertinent file name may be 
viewed on a forensic image of an evidentiary item. Even if the file bearing the critical 
data is not available a link file to it may be present. The metadata within the link file may 
show that the actual file associated with it was stored on a separate volume. The link files 
will show the volume that the file of interest was stored on. Our work shows that further 
information about the missing file can also be discovered. 
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III. WINDOWS REGISTRY INFORMATION GATHERING 
A. WHY USE A FORENSIC APPROACH? 
A forensic approach should be taken to document Registry artifacts. This is 
important from a scientific perspective and also from an evidentiary perspective. The 
scientific perspective involves managing a test environment so that quantifiable changes 
can be attributed to the introduction of a known variable. If this principle is followed, 
meaningful results can be relied upon. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) emphasizes the need for forensic results to be repeatable and 
reproducible (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2001). Repeatable 
conditions are defined as those where independent test results are obtained with the same 
method on identical test items in the same laboratory by the same operator using the same 
equipment within short intervals of time (NIST, 2001). Reproducible conditions are those 
where test results are obtained with the same method on identical test items in different 
laboratories with different operators using different equipment (NIST, 2001). The results 
obtained in the course of this research attempt to meet both of the NIST requirements for 
forensic tool validation.   
From the evidentiary perspective, adherence to a sound forensic methodology is 
necessary for the acceptance of findings to be presented in trial, according to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (FRE) 702 Article VII and the Daubert Ruling provide guidance on the 
competence of an expert witness and the relevance or reliability of the evidence presented 
(Smith & Bace, 2003). The Daubert Ruling augments the FRE 702 stating that the focus 
must be solely on the principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate. 
If a validated methodology is used in obtaining a set of results, it will generally meet 
these evidentiary requirements. These requirements are essential in maintaining the due 
process rights granted to citizens via the Bill of Rights and the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution.   
The core discipline of computer forensics requires the ability to preserve 
evidence, identify exactly what occurred on a digital device and the ability to explain 
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why events occurred and why they are relevant to the investigation (IACIS, 2015a). It 
does not matter whether a forensic examiner is reviewing a device for fraudulently 
produced identifications or responding to a network compromise. The digital footprints 
must remain intact so that an investigation can continue and meaningful artifacts can be 
recovered. Some of the artifacts will include metadata which document dates and times a 
file was created or modified. The file path where evidentiary files were located may also 
be significant.         
In the course of gathering the research findings for this document, the 
identification of specific created and modified values within the Registry was crucial. 
The goal of this work was to map locations where change occurred so that forensic 
examiners will know that these areas that may contain the crucial “bread crumbs” which 
show a bigger picture within a Windows 10 computer that they are tasked to investigate.    
B. USB ARTIFACTS POINT TO INTERESTING ACTIVITY 
The identification of USB connections can be an important part of a forensic 
investigation. The action of physically connecting an external storage device requires a 
purposeful human interaction and indicates a clear level of intent. The action may be 
completed with the specific intent to install malware, transfer files or to view files stored 
on a device. Identified activity with an external device can show clear evidence of a user 
failing to comply with office security policies, or that certain files were knowingly 
transferred. This thesis focuses on a registry analysis of artifacts related to USB 
connections.        
C. TOOLS OF THE TRADE IN WINDOWS REGISTRY FORENSIC 
ANALYSIS 
Several tools allow users to more easily observe the changes recorded in the 
Registry as a result of the introduction of an external media device, installation of a 
program, or other modification to the Windows OS. There are advantages and 
disadvantages associated with each tool. Rather than rely on a single tool, it is beneficial 
to use more than one tool when time permits. This practice allows the analyst to validate 
results, account for a wider scope of forensic artifacts, and maintain proficiency with a 
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variety of forensic software. This affords the forensic examiner the opportunity to fine-
tune their tools of choice with the goal of extracting a focused set of accurate data in a 
time-efficient manner. The sections below discuss some of the tools that were used in 
previous analyses of mounted-device artifacts in the Windows Registry.     
1. RegShot 
Regshot is an open source utility that documents and aggregates changes that are 
made to Windows Registry files. This application is available through the website 
http://sourceforge.net/projects/regshot/. The program works by taking an initial snapshot 
of a user-specified directory. After some number of changes, such as the installation of 
new applications or the introduction of an external digital media device, a second 
snapshot of the directory is taken and differences are exported into either a plain text or 
HTML document, depending on user preference. The tool has a simple graphical user 
interface (GUI) as shown in Figure 3. It is widely used by information technology (IT) 
specialists, home users and forensic examiners. Monitoring the Registry using RegShot is 
a convenient way for troubleshooting in the event that installation of a new application 
has an adverse effect on the operating system.     
 
Figure 3.  Shows a sample display of RegShot v1.9.0 
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2. RegRipper 
Another popular open-source tool for forensic Registry analysis is RegRipper, 
designed by Harlan Carvey. Figure 4 shows an example of the RegRipper graphical user 
interface (GUI) in the Windows 8 OS. It is not a comprehensive Registry analysis tool, 
but a platform for plugins, implemented in Perl, that extract information from registry 
hives. There are Linux and Windows-based versions of the program along with a set of 
324 useful prebuilt plugins that are available for download via https://github.com/ 
keydet89/RegRipper2.8. Eight of these prebuilt plugins focused on mounted device and 
USB artifact extraction. These plugins can also be custom written by users who possess 
an understanding of Perl scripting and know the type of details the plugin should parse 
from the Registry. A plugin that comparatively analyzes Registry changes identified after 
the introduction of a USB device was not available. A major benefit of this program over 
RegShot is that a log file is created when RegRipper is run. Log files are beneficial in 
forensics to add documentation of what processes were run on a specific evidence item. 
Forensic examiners generally maintain a timeline with detailed notes of what processes 
are run on evidence items and what the results of the processing were, however the 
inclusion of a log to accompany the notes can be valuable, especially when testifying in 
court. Log files automatically document a set of specified activities that occur within a 
program and their retention is required by the standard operating procedures (SOP) 
employed by some law enforcement agencies. 
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Figure 4.  A display of the RegRipper v2.8 program running on the Windows 8 
OS. 
3. SysInternals Suite 
The SysInternals Suite, a free tool by Microsoft, offers a process-monitoring tool 
known as ProcMon, which allows the user to identify real-time operations on a Windows 
workstation. The results displayed can be filtered in a number of ways to hone in on a 
specific data set. An icon on the home screen allows the user to focus the scope of their 
review to only Registry-related changes. These results can be further filtered by selecting 
the filter tab and specifying parameters that should exist for items to be displayed or 
hidden. When using ProcMon to view Registry changes as a result of introducing a new 
external media device, a filter can be applied to display only write operations to the 
Registry. This filter can be applied by selecting the options displayed in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5.  ProcMon filter to display write operations to Registry 
(after Bunting, 2012b) 
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After the filter is set and a mounted device is introduced, the resulting changes 
can be captured. The user can press the “CTRL E” key combination to begin and stop the 
recording. The feature is useful in narrowing the scope of observed events.        
4. EnCase Enterprise  
The EnCase platform also provides the forensic examiner with features for 
documenting changes to the Windows Registry. EnCase is the only commercially 
licensed software that was used for this thesis. The capabilities of value for this thesis 
were its ability to analyze records from the allocated and unallocated space, and the 
ability to categorize and hash data. 
The Windows Registry unallocated space can include deleted records and file 
fragments. Although complete analysis of the unallocated space is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, encountered artifacts are included in the findings below. EnCase features the 
ability to mount various Registry files, including values and records in unallocated space, 
as entries. To accomplish this, the user must select the two boxes shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6.  Registry file mount using EnCase. 
These entries can be hashed and analyzed to document change as a result of a 
controlled test. The results generated by a hash analysis alone can be voluminous; 
fortunately the scope of the results review can be further focused by sorting the dates and 
times that events occurred. This technique, in addition to corroborating that the Registry 
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recorded events with timeline, was useful in documenting changes in the Registry as a 
result of the introduction of an external media device.  
D. CROSS TOOL VALIDATION 
Windows Registry researchers such as Carvey (2011), Lee (2009) and Bunting 
(2012b) have used the tools discussed above to document mounted device artifacts in the 
Windows 7 and 8 Registries. Changes within specific hives were noted within previous 
versions of Windows. These artifacts have a great deal of investigative value when 
accounting for activity recorded on stand-alone machines. Forensic examiners and 
incident responders strive to obtain a big picture of the events logged on a given 
workstation. The observations documented with the set of tools listed above provided a 
common data set that effectively mapped areas reflecting change as result of mounting an 
external device.  
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IV. FORENSIC METHODOLOGY FOR OBTAINING RELEVANT 
REGISTRY RECORDS 
A. WINDOWS REGISTRY OBSERVATION GOALS 
The testing goal was to map the specific Windows 10 Registry values that were 
modified or created as a result of introducing an external device. It was also important to 
note the significance of each value change. Items of significance include the associated 
time and date values, the logged make and model values for each device that was 
introduced and associated serial number or unique identifiers. The locations of these 
specific value changes with additional identified artifacts described in the results section 
were documented to provide a comprehensive map of USB artifacts in the Windows 10 
registry. 
The workstation used for testing was a Hewlett Packard EliteBook 8570p laptop. 
This device will be referred to as the Master Control Workstation (MCW) throughout this 
document. The MCW system specifications are as follows: 
 3rd Generation Intel Core i5-3320M (2.6 GHz, 3 MB L3 cache, 2 cores) 
 16384 MB SODIMMs in both slots (Dual-core processor) 
 2 USB 3.0 ports 
 1394a port 
 Optical drive 
 eSATA/USB 2.0 combo port 
 750 GB hard drive       
B. SYSTEM SET UP CONSIDERATIONS 
The test environment was prepared in accordance with best practices established 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Association of Computer 
Investigative Specialists (IACIS) (International Association of Computer Investigative 
Specialists [IACIS], 2015a). Some of the recommended procedures for the creation of a 
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forensically sound environment include sterilization of the MCW hard drive prior to use, 
accountability for all data introduced into the MCW hard drive, and write protection of 
the original items in order to prevent the possibility of unintended modifications of the 
resident files. Several steps are discussed in the following sections that were taken in the 
course of this work to yield reproducible results. The obligation to produce results that 
bear these qualities is highlighted by the NIST testing methodology guidelines and the 
ISO 5725 document on the accuracy of measurement methods and results. In a court of 
law, the Daubert (Luttgens & Pepe, 2014) standard applies to the extent that it requires 
the presentation of forensically sound evidence.   
1. Forensic Wipe Requirements 
Wiping digital media is a standard forensic practice to ensure that all data that 
exists on a device is controlled. The practice is generally implemented to ensure that data 
is not comingled. A drive wipe can be defined as the process of overwriting digital media 
with known characters (usually 0’s) in order to ensure the elimination of all data that may 
have previously existed on that device. NIST refers to this prepared state of media as 
“forensically clean.”  The procedure will also eliminate areas of the hard drive that are 
normally not accessible by the user such as the manufacturer-installed drive configuration 
overlay (DCO) and host protected area (HPA) (IACIS, 2015a).    
There are UNIX commands, Linux commands, and several free or commercial 
utilities that can be used to accomplish this task. EnCase Enterprise was used to wipe the 
hard drive within the MCW prior to the installation of the Windows 10 operating system. 
At the completion of the wipe procedure, EnCase provided a log that documented that the 
procedure was successful. A visual inspection was also conducted of the hard drive at the 
byte level to confirm the success of the wipe operation.      
2.   Windows 10 Master Copy Installation 
The “Windows 10 Technical Preview 9879 (x64) – DVD (English)” was 
downloaded from the Microsoft Developer Network (MSDN) via the 
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/subscriptions/keys/ site using a separate computer from 
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the MCW. I burned the ISO file to a DVD and then installed Windows 10 from the DVD 
to the MCW. 
An Administrator account was created within Windows 10 on the MCW. The 
MCW was then shut down using the power off option within the Windows 10 operating 
system.   
3. EnCase Evidence File 
Generally a forensic image will contain a bit-for-bit record of the original 
evidence item. The E01 image format includes some checksums to ensure that the 
integrity of the forensic image is preserved. EnCase breaks up the original evidence 
image into blocks that are 2048 MB in size by default. This block size can be easily 
modified by the forensic examiner. Each of the chunks is assigned a cyclical redundancy 
check (CRC) value in the course of creating the image. The CRC values are comprised of 
16 or 32 bit values and assist in ensuring the integrity of the individual data blocks when 
acquiring a device with EnCase (Bunting, 2012a). At the end of the image creation 
process, a 128-bit Message Digest 5 (MD5) value is generated to ensure the integrity of 
the E01 evidence file. An abstract view of the EnCase evidence file is shown in Figure 7: 
 
Figure 7.  EnCase evidence file structure (from Bunting, 2012a) 
The E01 image file format can be logically copied to other storage devices for 
archiving or further forensic analysis. This image file format can be verified using 
EnCase Enterprise or free E01 file viewing applications such as AccessData’s FTK 
Imager. The verification value generated should always match the value of the original 
MD5 hash.     
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4. Master Copy Forensic Image Creation 
The hard drive was removed from the MCW after the initial Windows 10 
installation and was then connected to a Tableau firmware write block device1 to 
eliminate the possibility of changes to the data. EnCase Enterprise v7 was used on a 
separate computer to create an E01 evidence file of the write blocked MCW hard drive 
that would serve as the master copy image for testing Windows Registry changes that 
occur as a result of introducing a test thumb drive. No external devices were connected to 
the MCW prior to the creation of the master copy image.   
5. Evidence File Restoration and External Device Introduction 
Observations  
The E01 master copy image was used to restore the original image to the MCW 
hard drive for each test conducted with the introduction of a new thumb drive. Restoring 
a hard drive from the E01 file creates a sector-to-sector clone of the original hard drive to 
a hard drive indicated by the examiner (Bunting, 2012a). The hard drive selected for the 
restoration has to be of equal or larger size than that of the device that the image was 
created from. The EnCase option to overwrite remaining sectors after the allocated files 
were written to the test hard drive was selected. 
Following the image file restoration, the MCW was powered on and the time 
associated with this action was noted. The times associated with system login and thumb 
drive introduction to the system were also logged for future comparison with the records 
interpreted with the Registry analysis tools used in this work. Two thumb drives were 
introduced to the MCW to gather the Windows Registry artifact results summarized in 
this document. The selected devices were a SanDisk Extreme SDCZ80-032G 32 GB 
thumb drive bearing 8M140924838B and a Kingston DT101 G2 16 GB thumb drive. The 
thumb drives were connected to the MCW laptop for twenty minutes and then removed 
using the “Eject Mass Storage” option from the Windows operating system.  
                                                 1 Tableau write block devices are commercially available hardware that block write operations to a 
connected storage device. 
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C. REGISTRY FILE REVIEW 
The methodology utilized in my review of the registry hives was split into two 
categories: live and postmortem. Changes logged within the registry hives were actively 
monitored using ProcMon. RegRipper, EnCase, and RegShot were used to passively 
observe and validate the overlapping results observed from the respective registry hives, 
specifically the NTUser.dat, Software hive and System hive. These are hives where USB 
artifacts were located in previous versions of the Registry (IACIS, 2015b).  
1. ProcMon Version 3.10 Active Monitoring 
For this method of Windows Registry review, the SysInternalsSuite.zip file was 
copied to the MCW using a Windows drag and drop from a CD that was introduced. The 
Procmon.exe file was launched from the Desktop of the MCW and automatically began 
to display a detailed list of running processes. The event capture process was temporarily 
paused and the capture options were then modified so that only Windows Registry-
related values that wrote to the registry would be captured. Narrowing the focus of the 
capture events to these operations facilitated the documentation of Windows Registry 
values that were created or modified as a direct result of introducing the two test thumb 
drives described above. The capture process was then resumed immediately before 
introducing one of the test thumb drives to the MCW. The Registry values that were 
displayed by ProcMon were visually monitored and documented for a 20 minute cycle. 
No further operations were executed on the MCW during this period. At the end of this 
interval, I removed the test thumb drive using the “Safely Remove Hardware and Eject 
Media” feature within Windows. The ProcMon capture feature was then paused and the 
captured events were exported and preserved for a future cross comparison of results.           
2. EnCase Enterprise Observation Methodology 
After each test thumb drive was introduced to the Windows 10 operating system 
for a twenty minute interval, the MCW was shut down and the physical hard drive was 
removed. The hard drive was then attached to a Tableau forensic write block device and a 
logical image (L01) file was created using EnCase that contained the “config” folder 
from the “Windows\System32\” file directory and the NTUser.dat file from the 
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“Users\Jason.”  The hard drive would then be forensically wiped using EnCase and the 
controlled master image was restored to the hard drive so that the process could be 
repeated with the next test thumb drive. It was important to restore the master image to 
the MCW hard drive so that only results generated by the mounting process of each 
individual thumb drive could be recorded within the Windows Registry hives.     
The Software hive, System hive and NTUser.dat are the traditional locations 
where USB relevant artifacts have been identified in previous Windows versions (Lee, 
2009). These files were mounted within EnCase in order to review their file structure. 
The allocated and unallocated entries were parsed using the View File Structure feature 
of EnCase.   
The volume of the records from these registry files was substantial. EnCase 
recovered the following number of subkeys, values and deleted content records from the 
master image Windows Registry hives that were created immediately after the 
installation of the Windows 10 operating system and prior to the introduction of either of 
the test drives: 
 NTUser.dat:   8,309 
 Software:  946,509 
 System:  168,880 
The observed quantity of subkeys, values and deleted content records after the 










As shown in the above figures, the number of subkeys, values and deleted content 
records displayed was different for each Registry hive observed and the volume of 
records stored in each was diverse.    
The hash analysis capability of EnCase was used to identify the Registry values 
that changed as a result of the introduction of the test thumb drives to the MCW. A hash 
set was created of the System hive, Software hive, and NTUser.dat after the introduction 
of each test thumb drive. These hash sets were then compared to the respective MCW 
Registry hives. Differences that were observed in the hash analysis were not solely from 
the introduction of the test thumb drives. Thousands of changes can occur within the 
Windows Registry just by the action of powering on MCW. The hash matches were 
filtered and excluded from review and the resulting data set was then sorted by date and 
time to identify meaningful results. The hash matches were excluded from review so that 
only values representing a change after the introduction of a test thumb drive would be 
displayed.   
3. RegShot and RegRipper Data Collection Methodology 
The RegShot tool was used to take a snapshot of the Registry hives from the 
MCW that were exported prior to the introduction of any test thumb drive and compared 
to the snapshot created of the Registry hives post introduction. RegShot does not allow 
the user to select individual Registry hives for comparison. The user instead has to 
specify a directory containing the hive files. Text file and HTML file reports were 
generated using RegShot. Separate reports were generated to gather results that 
documented changes generated in the Registry for each test thumb drive introduced. 
These reports were then searched using artifacts identified in the course of the EnCase 
review. Table 1 details a comparison of the results identified using this tool. 
The RegRipper NTUser.dat, System hive and Software hive plugins were run on 
these respective registry hives that were extracted after the introduction of each of the test 
thumb drives. Reports were created to document the results of the plugin parsing of these 
hives. The Excel spreadsheets generated were reviewed and overlapping data located 
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during the ProcMon and EnCase review were compared and organized into the tables 
listed in Chapter V of this document.  
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V. IDENTIFIED USB ARTIFACTS WITHIN THE WINDOWS 10 
REGISTRY 
This thesis set out with the purpose of answering the question of how it can be 
forensically determined that a specific USB storage device was connected at some point to a 
computer system running the Windows 10 operating system (OS). The sections discuss 
methods that were successful in identifying the affected Registry entries and the 
shortcomings of other methods. We did not consider Registry changes that were not linked to 
a known USB identifier. The number of Registry values that are modified when a computer 
is powered on are voluminous. Registry changes are continuous without any user interaction 
while the computer is powered on and it is difficult to specifically link a Registry change to a 
USB device if there are no USB identifiers in a record so we ignored such cases.    
A. PROCMON FINDINGS 
The location of useful data regarding USB artifacts, just as with any kind of 
sleuthing, requires a good starting point. The best evidence available is often the kind that 
makes a record of an event as it occurs. This section will document the initial steps taken 
in documenting identifying information for the test thumb drives used in this thesis. 
1. USB Artifacts Identified  
The test thumb drives were initially connected to a forensic workstation 
configured with the Windows 8.1 Pro N OS using a write blocked device to document the 
properties and contents of the devices. A 32 GB SanDisk Extreme thumb drive and a 16 
GB Kingston DT101 thumb drive were used as test thumb drives for this thesis. The 
device contents and properties are described in Table 2. 
 16 GB Kingston DT101  32 GB SanDisk Extreme 
File System HFS FAT32 
# Files and Folders 722 8091 
Used Space/Free Space 4.88 GB/9.64 GB 5.73 GB/24.0 GB 
Device Content Yosemite OSX installation Windows 8 Installation 
Table 2.   Test thumb drive contents and properties 
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In these experiments, ProcMon provided the starting point in the process of 
identifying unique information specific to the test thumb drives. ProcMon provides real-
time monitoring capability of a specified grouping of processes that occur within the 
Windows OS. A filter was applied that facilitated the viewing of changes occurring 
exclusively in the Registry. They were introduced to a Hewlett Packard (HP) laptop 
configured with the Windows 10 OS technical build preview to test how the Registry 
logged changes when each of the devices were connected. This HP laptop is referred to as 
the Master Control Workstation (MCW) in this thesis.     
The test thumb drives were introduced to the MCW with ProcMon configured to 
display Registry changes. ProcMon provided a globally unique identifier (GUID) and 
serial number specific to each test thumb drive immediately after the test USB devices 
were connected to the MCW as shown in Table 2. GUIDs are also known as universally 
unique identifiers (UUIDs) and are designed to be unique 128 bit values. The GUID is 
used to identify a component object model (COM) object within the Registry (Mueller, 
2002). A GUID is generated in the Registry when a USB device is connected to a 
Windows OS. The GUID is a value that is designated by the OS, whereas the serial 
number is encoded into the USB device. A USB device may have a different GUID 
assigned if it is attached to a different computer, however the serial number value 
remains consistent. The serial number and GUID values populated Registry areas 
identified previously in the Windows 7 OS (Lee, 2009). Experimentation was conducted 
with attaching the same USB device to the MCW and other test workstations multiple 
times while running the ProcMon utility. ProcMon showed that the same GUID was 
associated with the same USB device each time it was connected to the same computer. 
When the specific USB device was connected to a separate computer running Windows, 
it was assigned a different GUID. The GUIDs and serial numbers associated with the 
USB devices provided search strings or keywords to locate other directories within the 
Registry where these values were stored. ProcMon was also able to log the make and 
model of the test thumb drives as shown in Table 3. 
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Identifier 16 GB Kingston DT101  32 GB SanDisk Extreme 
Product ID (PID) 6545 5580 
Vendor ID (VID) 0930 0781 





Table 3.   Identifying artifacts specific to each of the test thumb drives 











Table 4.   ProcMon identified locations displaying data specific to the 
SanDisk test thumb drive 
The VID and PID values listed in Tables 3 and 4 are useful to notate in 
conjunction with the other identifiers listed above. These are 32 bit values that are hard 
coded into USB devices by the manufacturer. These values can be researched to identify 
the make and model of a thumb drive. Performing a text string search of the Registry 
using only these search strings is a poor option for identifying Registry artifacts, as they 
are short and the search results include values not necessarily related to a USB device. 
The ProcMon findings were exported to Microsoft Excel spreadsheets for further 
review. Searches were conducted within the exported spreadsheets to locate Registry 
directories containing the make/model, serial numbers and GUIDs of the test USB 
devices. The values immediately identified by ProcMon after the test thumb drive 
introductions to the MCW are documented in Table 5. The same categories of values 
(make/model, serial number and GUID) were found under the same Registry key path for 
















Table 5.   ProcMon identified directories displaying data specific to the 
SanDisk Extreme device 
A search was conducted of the Excel spreadsheet that contained the results of the 
ProcMon monitoring using search strings that included the identified USB serial numbers 
and USB GUIDs corresponding to the test thumb drives entered into the Windows find 
feature. The directories identified as a result of this search are listed in Table 6. 
 





















HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USB\ VID, PID, serial 
number 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR\ Make/model, serial 
number 
Table 6.   ProcMon identified paths with USB identifiers 
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2. Registry Changes Documented Upon USB Removal 
Prior to removing the test thumb drives from the MCW, ProcMon was used to 
capture Registry changes that occur when USB devices are removed. In order to 
accomplish this, the local time and date values were confirmed to be accurate on the 
MCW. ProcMon was run on the MCW and a test thumb drive was introduced to the 
MCW. After a five-minute period, the test thumb drive was removed from the MCW 
using the “Safely Remove Hardware and Eject Media” option. The specific date and time 
of this option selection and the removal time of the test thumb drive were noted. 
ProcMon logging was stopped after the removal of the test thumb drive. The ProcMon 
results were exported to Microsoft Excel spreadsheets for review. This process of 
ProcMon logging was repeated with the next test thumb drive. Based on the results listed 
in the Excel spreadsheets corresponding with the removal times of the test devices, a 
common set of Registry areas were noted for both devices where changes occurred as 
shown in Table 7.   
 



















Table 7.   Thumb drive removal changes in Registry 
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While other changes were noted within ProcMon when the devices were removed, 
the results are not listed here because no commonality in the processes was noted 
between the test devices. 
A forensic image was created of the MCW config folder and NTUser.dat file after 
the two test thumb drives were introduced. This forensic image was then processed 
within EnCase and the common paths listed in Table 5 were reviewed for forensic 
artifacts. The HKLM\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\Windows Search\VolumeInfoCache 
path had a record for the volume name associated with the last test thumb drive 
introduced to the MCW. The date and time that was associated with this value did not 
correspond to the removal time, however the date was accurate when compared to the 
date the test thumb drives were introduced. It was unclear what time the value in this 
field corresponded with. The additional paths in Table 6 were also reviewed, however it 
was not possible to tie any of the times stored in the paths to the date the test thumb drive 
was actually removed, or other USB identifiers used for searching in this thesis.   
B. REGSHOT AND REGRIPPER RESULTS 
EnCase was used to access the forensic images created of the MCW Registries. 
One of these images was created prior to the insertion of either test thumb drive. There 
were also two separate forensic images of the MCW Registries that were created after 
each test thumb drive insertion and removal. Prior to the introduction of each test thumb 
drive to the MCW the original forensic image was restored to the MCW hard drive using 
EnCase so that the Registry artifacts related to each test thumb drive would not be 
comingled.   
EnCase was then used to export the config folders from each of the images for 
testing with RegShot. The config folder for the MCW Registry that was created prior to 
the introduction of either of the test thumb drive was exported to a folder on a forensic 
workstation labeled “Clean Registry Files.”  The config folders for the Registries after the 
introduction of each of the test thumb drives were exported to folders labeled “SanDisk 
Registry Files” and “Kingston Registry Files” respectively.   
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RegShot was initially used to create a snapshot of the config folder within the 
“Clean Registry Files” folder. RegShot does not have an option for the user to conduct an 
individual snapshot of the Software, NTUser.dat and System Registry files for exclusive 
comparison. Instead, a directory containing the config folder contents must be selected. 
RegShot was then used to create a snapshot from the “SanDisk Registry Files” folder. 
The “Compare” feature within RegShot was then used to compare the snapshots. This 
process was repeated to analyze the config files within the “Kingston Registry Files” 
folder.     
The text files generated from the RegShot comparative analyses included “Folders 
Added,” “Folders deleted,” “Files added,” and “Values added” sections. These sections 
show values that are drawn only from the Registry entries. The snapshots that were 
compared of the Registry before and after the introduction of the test thumb drives to the 




SanDisk Extreme Kingston DT101 
Folders were added 40 0 
Values modified 20 16 
Values added 197 3 
Files added 3 0 
Table 8.   RegShot changes noted. 
None of the changes recorded appeared to document Windows 10 Registry 
modifications from a USB device. The RegShot generated text file was searched using 
text strings that included the test thumb drive make and models, serial numbers and 
GUIDs and no positive results were observed.  
The lack of USB artifact results was unusual and efforts were made to ensure the 
RegShot application was properly run. RegShot was run on a separate computer running 
the Windows 8.1 Pro N OS. An initial snapshot of the Windows 8.1 workstation Registry 
was created prior to the insertion of a thumb drive. A 4 GB PNY thumb drive was then 
connected to this computer and was left connected to it for five minutes. The “Safely 
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Remove Hardware and Eject Media” option was then selected within Windows and the 
thumb drive was removed. The secondary snapshot of the config folder was then created. 
Comparison with the first snapshot allowed retrieval of information about the PNY 
thumb drive information, shown in Table 9. This was the only record that confirmed 
RegShot retrieved USB artifacts for the PNY and this was confirmed via a text string 
search of the output file using the make/model and serial number as search strings. 







**Binary mof compiled successfully” 
Device Make & serial 
number 
Table 9.   RegShot USB findings on Windows 8.1 Pro N OS 
RegShot was also run on the MCW running the Windows 10 Technical preview 
OS. Snapshots were created of the Registry before and after thumb drive insertion. The 
compare utility was then run. The first and second snapshots completed successfully, 
however the compare snapshot failed and results were not displayed. Several attempts 
were made to execute the RegShot compare utility on the MCW. These attempts were not 
successful and resulted in the error listed in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.  RegShot failed to run on the MCW configured with Windows 10   
The RegRipper Software, System and NTUser plugins were run on the Registry 
files extracted from the MCW after the test thumb drives were introduced. After the 
plugins were run, a text file was generated detailing the results. A review conducted of 
the RegRipper output files revealed the list of directories shown in Table 10. These 






Table 10.   Directories containing USB artifacts as detected using RegRipper 
RegRipper identified the volume letter associated with the mounted USB devices, 
accurately identified the date and time the devices were introduced to the MCW, and the 
make/model and serial number of the device. The serial numbers were verified to 
correspond with the test thumb drive serial numbers obtained with the ProcMon utility 
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and also with EnCase as discussed in later sections of this thesis. An example of the 
RegRipper documentation of the SanDisk test thumb drives shown in Figure 9.   
 
Figure 9.  RegRipper detection SanDisk USB device 
The paths identified by RegRipper in Table 10 were also identified by ProcMon 
with the exception of SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\ path. None of the 
directories identified with RegRipper were identified using the RegShot tool with either 
of the test thumb drives. 
C. ENCASE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
1. EnCase Inspection of ProcMon and RegRipper Identified Directories: 
Two forensic images were created of the config folder and NTUser.dat files for 
analysis with EnCase. One of the images was created after the Kingston test thumb drive 
was introduced to the MCW and the second was created after the SanDisk thumb drive 
was presented.     
EnCase was initially used to navigate to the Registry paths identified using the 
ProcMon and RegRipper results documented in the above listed tables. The dates and 
times documenting the test thumb drive times of insertion were found to be accurate to 
the minute within EnCase. The paths were verified within the Registry files specific to 
both of the test USB devices and the common findings with the artifacts observed using 
EnCase are listed in Table 11. 
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Table 11.   EnCase validation of data previously located with RegRipper and 
ProcMon 
After reviewing the results in Table 11, the Registry changes identified for test 
thumb drive removal were revisited to review if changes were documented in path 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MountPoints2\ when the 
thumb drives were removed. The comprehensive ProcMon records did not show changes 
made to this path when the test USB devices were removed. There were records in the 
ProcMon spreadsheets indicating modification to these paths shortly after the test thumb 
drives were introduced to the MCW. This path showed accurate removal dates and times 
for both of the test thumb drives used in this thesis.          
2. Directories Identified through EnCase Indexed Searches 
Encase has the capability to mount Registry keys and parse the allocated and 
unallocated space. The allocated and unallocated spaces were indexed using EnCase. 
Indexed searches were then conducted of the allocated and unallocated space using the 
search strings DT101, Kingston, SanDisk, serial number AA010930142143130243 and 
serial number: 00D0C9CCDEFCEC50B0006D2A. As a result of these searches, 
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additional directories were identified containing USB Registry artifacts for both of the 










Table 12.   Directories with USB artifacts as identified using indexed searches 
EnCase text string searches were also conducted with a selection of file names 
obtained from the contents of the test thumb drives. A sample of the Kingston and 
SanDisk test thumb drive files and folders is listed in Table 13. 
Kingston SanDisk 





Table 13.   Test thumb drive text search strings based on content. 
Searches conducted with the terms listed in Table 13 did not result in the 
identification of Registry artifact that appeared specifically associated with either of the 
test thumb drives. Any resulting values were inspected for indications of date and time 
matches and none were apparent. 
3. EnCase Hash Analysis Results Justify the Need for Index Searches 
The methodology used in creating the hash sets involved mounting the Registry 
keys within EnCase and parsing the records of the allocated and unallocated space. The 
Software, System and NTUser.dat keys were each mounted and the contents of these 
keys were hashed using the MD5 algorithm. The hash sets were observed to have 
 37
multiple duplicate MD5 values. A hash set was created from the MD5 hash values 
associated with the Software, System and NTUser.dat that were extracted from the MCW 
prior to the introduction of either test thumb drive. This hash set will be referred to as the 
control hash set. EnCase was used to create separate hash sets of the Software, System 
and NTUser.dat files that were extracted after each of the respective test thumb drives 
were introduced to the MCW. The control hash set was run against the keys extracted 
after the test thumb drives were presented to the MCW. This process was run with the 
intention of omitting a large set of data from the EnCase review. Within EnCase, a filter 
can be applied to omit items that match a hash set from review. While the process was 
successful in decreasing the number of Registry values for manual review by thousands 
of entries, it was not successful in uncovering directories containing USB device-specific 
information. Many hash values in the Registry have nothing to do with values that change 
as a result of the introduction of a USB device to a computer. This particular approach 
was not a feasible method for isolating comprehensive Registry values generated from 
USB devices.     
4. Indexed Searches and the Identification of Deleted Values 
Indexed searches for known values aid in identifying Registry directories of 
interest. EnCase detected over 80,000 values that were deleted from the System Registry 
hive after the SanDisk test thumb drive was introduced to the MCW.    The significance 
of this finding is that while ProcMon, RegRipper and RegShot can detect some Registry-
affected areas in the allocated space, they cannot account for a bigger picture of 
unallocated Registry directories and values. The unallocated search capability of EnCase 
made text string searches valuable in our experiments.    
The values listed in Table 14 were known to be in unallocated space because they 
were listed as deleted entries with Registry paths in EnCase. After the EnCase searches 
were conducted, a filter was applied so that only directories and values with a unique 
hash value were displayed. The results were sorted by item path in Table 14 to identify 


























Table 14.   Sample of deleted Registry directories containing USB specific 
data 
Thousands of values and directories were identified in the unallocated space of 
the Registry files reviewed using EnCase. Many documents have been written detailing 
unallocated-space artifacts related to the introduction of various known variables within 
the Registry (Thomassen, 2008). The directories identified in the above descriptions are a 
sample of forensic artifacts recovered in the testing for this document.       
D. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The tools evaluated in this research had varying degrees of success in identifying 
USB artifacts that are beneficial to a CFE. The live monitoring capability of ProcMon 
was helpful in obtaining an initial listing of Registry areas demonstrating change as a 
direct result of test thumb drive presentation. RegShot testing was unsuccessful and it is 
possible that there was a compatibility issue with this program and the Windows 10 OS, 
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especially because the program was successfully run on a Windows 8 test system. The 
RegRipper plugins were successful in retrieving USB artifacts from directories they were 
written to scan. EnCase was the most useful tool for validating the findings of other tools 
and providing the ability to review allocated and unallocated records. Table 15 displays 
the Registry paths that were identified in the course of this research and the tools that 
were able to note USB artifacts in these locations.  
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X   X 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WBEM\WDM\DREDGE\U
SBSTOR 
X   X 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWSNT\CURRENT
VERSION\EMDMgmt\ 
X   X 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WindowsPortable 
Devices\Devices\ 
X   X 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\STORAGE\VOLUME\ X  X X 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\SWD\WPDBUSENUM
\ 
X  X X 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USB\ X  X X 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR\ X   X 
SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\  X  X  
SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Hardware 
Profiles\UnitedVideo\CONTROL\VIDEO\ 
X    
(Unallocated)SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\  X    
(Unallocated)HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\STORAG
E\VOLUME\ 
X    
(Unallocated)HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTO
R\ 
X    
(Unallocated)SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Hardware 
Profiles\UnitedVideo\CONTROL\VIDEO\ 
X    
Table 15.   Complete listing of paths holding test USB drive specific artifacts 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. IMPACT 
This document provides a starting point for Computer Forensic Examiners (CFEs) 
tasked with analyzing the Windows 10 Registry. This will be important in the near future 
as Windows 10 will be officially released on July 29, 2015, and it will be the default OS 
installed on many brands of newly purchased computers. Taking a cue from Mac OS, 
Windows 10 will also be available as a free upgrade for Windows 7 and Windows 8 
users. As discussed in Chapter II, the majority of users (58%) preferred Windows 7 and 
approximately 15% of users had desktops configured with the Windows 8 OS 
(Netmarketshare, 2015). Windows 10 marketing is advertising that this OS will combine 
the strengths of Windows 7 and 8 into a familiar interface and it is likely that a large 
percentage of users will accept the free upgrade to Windows 10 (Microsoft, 2015). This 
implies that there will be a global increase in the number of Windows 10 systems 
analyzed as a result of criminal and internal investigations. 
The Registry documents many modification and write operations and this 
contributes to the overall stability of the OS. This information provides a wealth of 
forensic artifacts for a CFE. Some of the paths identified in this document identify the 
date and time a thumb drive of specific make, model and serial number was introduced to 
or removed from a Windows 10 OS. This information is useful in identifying user 
activity and monitoring when specific actions occurred on a computer. It can be 
especially helpful in malware investigations because thumb drives are an important 
source of malware. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The artifacts presented in this thesis are only a start regarding forensically useful 
Windows 10 Registry artifacts, as only USB-related artifacts were discussed. For 
example, the Windows Registry can also document changes that occurred as a result of 
installing and running a program, the uniform resource locator (URLs) entries entered 
into an Internet browser by a specific user, and the Registry changes that document the 
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option to bypass the recycle bin when deleting files so that they go directly to unallocated 
space. Research will have to be conducted to tie an artifact with an action and tying an 
action with an activity executed by a user. Windows 10 also has many new features that 
will offer new Registry artifacts of interest.   
Microsoft Edge, a new Internet browser, allows the user to create notes related to 
websites visited through the browser and to share pages with others. It will likely provide 
new kinds of artifacts. Cortana is a personal assistant with a notebook feature capable of 
tracking high volumes of user information such as interests and favorite places 
(Microsoft, 2015). If the feature is enabled, it will no doubt hold useful information for a 
CFE. Windows 10 will also be compatible with certain cellular phones, tablets and 
computers, and the behavior across these devices may show new artifacts.     
C. CONCLUDING REMARK 
Windows 10 contains forensically uncharted features and the Registry artifacts 
related to these features will require time to identify. The Registry in previous versions of 
Windows has contained many useful artifacts for CFEs that show indicators of user 
behavior and assist in the documentation of events that occurred on a system. Registry 
information can supplement an interview while a search warrant is taking place, or 
provide answers for various system actions when few other sources are available. 
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